In addition to the critical and underappreciated role of RSAs, weak nationalism and democratic norms, and Russia's own strong interest in an economic hierarchy play an important role in explaining the current relationship between the two states. This article uses process-tracing to demonstrate how a weak state's leader can use RSAs to his advantage. While Russian President Vladimir Putin has attempted to ruthlessly force Lukashenka into acquiescing control over Belarus' pipelines, Lukashenka has held firm, using an aggressive attacking campaign against Putin. The first and previously most ignored variable is the degree of relation-specific assets (RSAs), most notably. What can account for this seemingly irrational behavior? In analyzing Belarus' membership in the Russia neo-empire, I find that four factors explain President Aleksandyr Lukashenka's decision to sacrifice some sovereignty to Russia. States sometimes sacrifice sovereignty to other states. As might be expected, various other German publications on the background of the war which appeared in the 1920s and 1930s, including Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette and other such editions of government documents, similarly maintained a discreet silence on this subject. and some of its accomplishments, they remained studiously vague on many issues, particularly with regard to the espionage operations which had been conducted in the Entente countries in the years prior to the Great War.
While the last chief of that organization, Walter Nicolai, and some of his former subordinates wrote a number of books and articles after 1918 in which they described the functions of the N.D. The army intelligence service of Imperial Germany-officially known as the Geheime Nachrichtendienst des Heeres or, more simply, as the “N.D.”-was no exception to this rule. In institutional terms, modified autocratic politics defined politico-military jurisdictions and the limits of higher-level coordinating authority in ways that precluded optimal collaboration during strategy development, war planning, and resource allocation.īecause of the politically sensitive and often quite unsavory aspects of their work, but also because they wish to protect their former agents, secret services usually do not like to say very much about their past activities and try to keep their records out of the hands of historians and other outsiders for as long as possible. In Russia, prevailing notions of statecraft and monarchical prerogative often inhibited the effective linking of ends, ways, and means according to a mature understanding of higher, or grand, strategy. Setting the Terms These outcomes testified to anomalies and dysfunctions that lay below the surface of the apparent system. The result during the initial period of conflict was catastrophic failure against Germany and only partial success against Austria-Hungary.
When war did come, this system's inadequacies and internal inconsistencies meant that Russia would enter hostilities as it had entered nearly all its past wars, like a chess player with poor opening moves. However, only the second, sometimes called the “Sukhomlinov System” after Russia's last pre-1914 war minister, would be put to the test. For various reasons, neither period's system fully met requirements for engagement in a Great Power war. Some knowledgeable observers termed these stages “systems,” because in varying degrees each period gave rise to an overarching scheme with a governing strategy that flowed from geopolitical circumstance, threat assessment, alliance commitments, course of action development, detailed planning, and resource allocation. The first was very long and the second very brief, and there was a jagged transition between the two. Between 18, Russian preparation for a European war evolved through two stages.
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